Does migration facilitate regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks? The evidence from post-communist economies indicates that the efficacy of migration in reducing inter-regional unemployment and wage differentials has in fact been rather low. High wages appear to encourage, and, similarly, high unemployment tends to discourage, overall migration -inbound and outbound -rather than induce a net flow from depressed regions to those with better economic conditions. Even when the impact of unemployment and wages on net migration is statistically significant, it is economically very small. Finally, migration flows have actually been declining in the course of transition, even as inter-regional disparities have been rising.
Introduction
Migration, or labor mobility 1 , is an important economic phenomenon. Migrants move from regions with high unemployment and/or low incomes to more prosperous regions, attracted by higher wages and better employment prospects. In this manner, migration helps facilitate regional adjustment to asymmetric shocks (such as an idiosyncratic fall in demand for the region's products, or technological progress that renders productive facilities in the region obsolete). In a hypothetical economy with perfect labor mobility, regions would adjust to asymmetric shocks instantaneously. 2 When factor mobility is limited and/or prices and wages rigid, however, the effects of asymmetric shocks persist and regional economies have to rely on other mechanisms, such as inter-regional fiscal redistribution, to deal with them. A common comparison in this context is the difference between the US and continental Europe (see, for example, Eichengreen, 1993 Eichengreen, , 1998 . In the US, labor mobility is high and plays an important role in reducing unemployment and wage differentials between regions (Blanchard and Katz, 1992) . In contrast, European countries often display persistent economic differences between regions such as North and South of Italy, or East and West Germany, and labor mobility contributes little in smoothing those differentials away (Decressin and Fatas, 1995) .
The role of migration in facilitating regional adjustment is particularly important in countries undergoing fundamental structural changes. The post-communist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe initiated economic reforms with essentially no (official) unemployment and very egalitarian wage distribution. The subsequent transition from central planning to a market economy, however, was associated with dramatic and largely asymmetric economic developments (for example, regions differed in their dependence on trade with the CMEA, see Repkine and Walsh, 1999) . In turn, these developments lead to increasing regional disparities (see section 4 and the appendix for a more detailed discussion).
The widening gap between prosperous and depressed regions increases the need for regional adjustment, with migration being a potentially important mechanism evening out interregional differentials in wages and unemployment rates. This paper analyzes the efficacy of this mechanism in four Central European transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. For comparison, results for three Southern European EU countriesItaly, Spain, and Portugal -are also presented.
Although studying migration is interesting in its own right, two additional considerations are important in the context of labor mobility in transition economies. First, the next round of EU enlargement is expected to bring a net inflow of migrants from the acceding countries to the current EU members. While most experts estimate that the inflow will be relatively modest (see Fidrmuc et al., 2002 , for a survey of migration forecasts and discussion of labormarket implications of immigration), this expectation is not generally shared by policy makers or the public at large in the EU, and especially in the front-line countries such as Austria and Germany. While the paper at hand does not present an alternative forecast of the migration potential, it sheds light on the patterns of migration in the countries that are likely to be included in the first wave of EU enlargement. The comparison with Southern European countries is particularly instructive in this context.
Second, the efficacy of migration as a shock-absorbing mechanism will have important repercussion for the transition economies' future membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). If the new entrants continue to be exposed to asymmetric shocks (compared to those affecting the EMU core countries), giving up autonomous monetary policy will increase the need for alternative adjustment mechanisms. As labor mobility is one of such mechanisms, its efficacy in facilitating regional adjustment will have important repercussions also for the question of optimality of the transition countries' accession to the EMU.
In general, net migration does respond to regional economic conditions in the expected way -net immigration is positively related to the average wage and negatively to the unemployment rate prevailing in the destination region. However, the effect is economically very small -sizeable wage and unemployment differentials only give rise to modest net migration flows. This is so because wages and unemployment affect gross inflows and outflows similarly. Thus, regions with high wages tend to experience high immigration as well as emigration (rather than high immigration and low emigration). This pattern appears quite universally across all transition economies included in the analysis. In some transition economies, the effect of unemployment on gross migration flows is similar -high unemployment discourages not only immigration to but also emigration from depressed regions. This pattern implies that regions with relatively favorable economic conditions display high migration -both inbound and outbound -whereas depressed regions show low mobility and thus remain locked in with low average wages and high unemployment.
Moreover, migration flows have generally been declining since the onset of transition. The efficacy of labor mobility as a channel of regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks has been therefore rather low.
After briefly reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on migration in the following section, the data and recent labor market developments in transition economies are discussed in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Results of the empirical analysis are presented in section 5. The implications for EU and EMU enlargement are then discussed in section 6.
Finally, main conclusions of the present paper are summarized the last section.
2 Migration: Theories and Empirical Evidence
Theoretical foundations of modern migration literature 3 were laid by Todaro (1969) , and Harris and Todaro (1970) . In their framework, migration is motivated by expected earnings differentials, i.e. wage differential between home and destination regions, adjusted for the probability of employment at destination. Accordingly, the higher the wage (the lower the unemployment rate) in the region of destination, the greater will be immigration to that region. Faini and Venturini (1994) argue, however, that the effect of wages in the region of origin need not be linear because migration from poor regions may be limited by liquidity constraints. With rising wages at home, emigration may in fact increase rather than decline as the liquidity constraint ceases to be binding. Only for relatively affluent regions do rising wages reduce the incentive for migration. Borjas (1987) points out that migration responds not only to average wages but also to their dispersion reflecting underlying inter-regional differences in rewards to skills. In particular, regions (countries) with relatively egalitarian wage distribution will attract primarily low-skilled workers, whereas high-skilled workers will choose to migrate to regions with more uneven wage distribution, where the returns to skills are higher (Borjas, 1987) . Stark (1991) An important aspect of migration is its capacity to facilitate regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks. 4 When factors of production are mobile, labor and capital move in response to output shocks until marginal returns are equalized across regions. If, on the other hand, factor mobility is limited, asymmetric shocks lead to persistent inter-regional differentials in unemployment and wages. 5 Blanchard and Katz (1992) assess regional adjustment using US state-level data and conclude that the bulk of adjustment occurs via labor mobility (after an initial increase in unemployment) rather than capital mobility or price and wage adjustment. Moreover, the adjustment is relatively fast, with the effect of a shock disappearing completely after five to seven years. Hence, labor in the US is highly mobile and responds readily to idiosyncratic economic shocks. In contrast, Decressin and Fatas (1995) find that in Western Europe, the effects of such shocks are absorbed mainly by changes in labor-force participation rather than migration. Indeed, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) argue that the responsiveness of migration to unemployment and wage differentials is much lower in the EU compared to the US. As a result, wage and unemployment differentials are generally greater and more persistent in Europe than in the US. This lack of labor mobility is often seen as a potential threat to the stability of the EMU (see Eichengreen, 1993 Eichengreen, , 1998 Braunerhjelm et al., 2000) . When idiosyncratic shocks have permanent or highly persistent effects, pressure for accommodating policy measures in affected regions or countries intensifies. The ability of individual countries in Europe to implement such measures, however, is severely limited because of the loss of monetary autonomy and the constraints on fiscal policy imposed by the Maastricht criteria.
Migration in transition economies received little attention so far, in part perhaps because of lack of suitable data. The main exception is the former East Germany, where massive outflow of East Germans to West Germany was expected in the wake of the reunification but did not materialize (see Burda, 1999, and Hunt, 2000) . On the contrary, by mid 1990s, the number of migrants moving to the East approximately equalized with that leaving for West
Germany. The lack of massive migration is often attributed to rapid (partial) convergence of wages in the new Federal States to the West German level and the transfers from the West (see Sinn, 1999) , or the expectation of such convergence (Burda, 1995) . The empirical analysis of Burda (1999) and Hunt (2000) confirms the importance of wage and unemployment differentials, but also highlights the generally low labor mobility in Germany (East and West).
Data
The paper at hand analyzes migration flows in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The choice of these countries was motivated by several considerations. First, they all are candidates for EU membership and have very high probability to be included in the next wave of EU enlargement. Second, since the collapse of communism, they have undergone rigorous economic and political reforms and, by late 1990s, have, by and large, accomplished the transition from central planning to market economy. Finally, and rather importantly, the necessary regional data is available for these countries.
Is interesting to compare patterns of migration in transition economies with market economies. Therefore, the analysis is also performed for three Southern European countries - 
Labor Market Developments in Transition Economies
The transition from central planning to a market economy has had dramatic labor-market In the presence of substantial regional disparities, workers in depressed regions stand to gain by moving to regions with higher wages and/or better employment opportunities. If this mechanism is effective, migration will eventually smooth away the effects of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, despite sizeable and growing gap between prosperous and depressed regions, migration in transition economies in fact declined in the course of reforms (see the Appendix). There may be several reasons for the overall fall in migration -rising costs of outof-district job search and moving, or worsening situation at the housing market. Rising unemployment nation wide may also discourage migration as it reflects a general deterioration of employment prospects (as argued by Decressin, 1994).
Because of the different size of regions, direct comparison of labor mobility in transition economies and Western European countries is not straightforward. In general, the smaller the regions, the greater is the extent of migration across regional boundaries. Hence, when considering the size of regions, labor mobility in transition countries appears very low in international comparison.
Migration as Adjustment to Shocks
Migration is one of the principal mechanisms (alongside capital mobility and price flexibility) for absorbing adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Consider a region hit by a permanent negative demand shock. As a result of such a shock, unemployment rises and wages fall. The region can absorb, or smooth away, the effects of this shock in a number of ways. First, via migration -adverse labor-market conditions may induce the region's residents to leave and take up employment in regions with higher wages and better employemtn prospects. Second, via capital mobility -lower wages and plentiful labor may induce new firms to move into the region. And finally, the relative price level can adjust sufficiently (either by falling wages and prices or by currency depreciation, if the region has its own currency) so that demand for the region's products rises again. This section investigates the efficacy of the first channel of regional adjustment, migration, and its responsiveness to regional economic characteristics, in particular unemployment rates and average wages.
The dependent variables are both gross and net migration normalized by population -so that they measures migration rates rather than flows. The data record the total number of migrants (inbound and outbound) per district, without identifying the regions of origin or destination. Gross inflow and outflow rates are strongly correlated, with correlation coefficients of 0.78 for the Czech Republic, 0.77 for Slovakia and 0.92 for Poland (the correlations are measured over the entire available period for each country, only net migration flows are available for Hungary). This implies that if some variables affect both inflows and outflows in the same direction, the coefficients estimated for the net immigration rate may be biased (see Bauer and Zimmerman, 1995) . Therefore, it is important to consider both gross and net migration. Gross migration flows also appear strongly persistent (much more so than net migration), the correlation coefficients for gross migration rates in 1992 and 1996 are between 0.6 and 0.8 for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.
The analysis covers between three and seven years for the transition countries and between seven and twelve years for the EU countries (the choice of periods is mandated primarily by data availability). All regressions include year dummies, with the first available year as the reference year. The results for the transition economies are reported in Tables 1   through 4 . The focus of the analysis is on the impact of regional unemployment rates and average wages on inter-regional migration. Therefore, the most parsimonious regressions are estimated only with these two variables. These results are reported in the first panel of each The results suggest that although unemployment rates and average wages indeed affect migration in transition economies, the pattern is only imperfectly consistent with the role of migration as a mechanism of regional adjustment to shocks. In order for migration to be effective as a channel of regional adjustment, gross (and net) immigration should be positively related to average wages and negatively to unemployment, while gross emigration should be positively related to unemployment and negatively to wages. However, this is not the pattern that obtains for migration in the transition economies. On the one hand, unemployment and average wages have the correct signs in the regressions with net migration and are usually at least marginally significant. Hence, it appears that high wages and low unemployment indeed encourage net immigration. On the other hand, unemployment apparently discourages overall migration (except in Poland), i.e. not only immigration but also emigration. Similarly, high wages tend to be associated with higher overall migration, inbound and outbound. Hence, the efficacy of migration in facilitating relocation of labor from depressed districts to the relatively prosperous ones appears rather limited. Instead, regions with favorable economic conditions tend to experience high immigration as well as emigration, whereas depressed regions display generally low labor mobility.
Allowing for a non-linear relationship between wages and migration should help capture the role of fixed migration costs. If the ex ante costs of job search and moving present a barrier to migration, the relationship should be U-shaped -migration pays only when the resulting wage gain is large enough. Thus, high wage regions should receive a disproportionate number of migrants (the effect on gross emigration is less clear-cut -a Ushaped relationship would indicate that migrants are liquidity constrained prior to moving and thus cannot move even if the post-migration gain sufficiently large). The regressions reveal a rather surprising pattern. The results for gross migration are mixed, the effect of wages appears hump-shaped in the Czech Republic and U-shaped for Poland and Slovakia (and, as before, wages affect gross immigration and emigration in the same way). The effect on net immigration, however, turns out hump-shaped -rather than U-shaped -in all four countries.
In other words, high-wage regions tend to receive a disproportionately low number of migrants, despite their high wages. Moreover, wages beyond certain level (ranging between 4.7% and 27.5% above national average wage for Slovakia and Hungary, respectively), apparently lead to falling net immigration. The hump shaped effect may be driven by outliers, in particular the major city districts, which typically experienced net emigration despite high wages. However, with the exception of Hungary, the pattern remains robust also when reestimating the regressions with dummies for the city districts or the districts that contain the capital city, or when the urban districts are completely omitted. For Hungary (see column 4 of The additional socio-economic and demographic variables appear to exert important effect on migration as well. Urbanization (measured by the log of population density) discourages net immigration (possibly because of congestion). Its effect on gross flows differs across the individual countries though. The dummy for suburbs turns out to be quite important in explaining migratory flows -suburban districts tend to have higher overall migration and receive a net inflow of migrants.
The number of entrepreneurs in the region, intended as a measure of the emerging private sector, is significantly and positively related to the inflow and outflow of migrants (except in Poland). It also appears to encourage net immigration. Hence, districts with a large and vibrant private sector tend to display higher labor mobility and attract a net migration inflow.
This result is similar to that obtained for average wages, and may indeed reflect the same underlying pattern -the nascent private sector likely attracts the more productive and better skilled workers, and these workers are in turn more mobile relative to the rest of the population. As with wages, however, the bulk of migration flows again appears to be among districts with relatively favorable economic conditions. In order to better facilitate regional adjustment, entrepreneurial activity should encourage immigration and discourage rather than encourage emigration. The only transition economy where this appears to be the case(at least partially) is Poland, where the effect of entrepreneurial activity on immigration is insignificant and the effect on emigration is negative.
It is instructive to compare transition economies with market economies. Tables 5 through 7 present regression results obtained for Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where migration is related to regional unemployment rates, average wages as well as population density (because of the larger size of Western European regions, the dummy for suburban regions is irrelevant).
The results are mixed. In contrast to the transition economies, the pattern of migration in Italy and Portugal is rather close to the optimal response of migration to regional unemployment and wages. In particular, immigration is positively related to average wages and negatively to unemployment, whereas emigration is positively related to unemployment (the effect of wages on gross emigration appears negative for Portugal and positive for Italy but the 9 Unfortunately, reliable data on house prices are not available.
coefficients are insignificant for both countries). The effects of unemployment and wages on net migration are also consistent with migration facilitating regional adjustment to shocks and strongly significant. 10 The results for Spain are more disappointing. Unemployment seems to discourage gross migration flows in Spain, although its effect on net migration has the correct sign. The effect of average wages appears with incorrect sign for gross as well as net flows.
As with the transition economies, when considering a non-linear effect of wages on migration, the relationship appears hump-shaped.
Hence, the evidence on the pattern of migration in transition economies suggests that migration does respond to regional differences in unemployment rates and wages, but in a manner that is only partially consistent with migration serving as a channel of regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks. Low mobility in depressed regions may be attributed to several factors. First, fixed costs of migration (for example, search and information costs, costs of moving, etc.) may be sufficiently high to deter low-wage earners and the unemployed from migrating (although the hump-shaped relationship between wages and net migration does not appear consistent with this explanation). Second, employment prospects for highskilled labor may be generally better so that the pool of potential migrants may consist largely of high-skilled workers earning relatively high wages. Finally, the low mobility in depressed regions may be due to structural factors. For example, if workers' human capital is not transferable across industries, then the unemployed workers in regions that were traditionally dominated by communist-era industries may have little options other than staying put.
Even more importantly, the potential effect of migration on regional differences in unemployment and wages is economically small. According to the regressions estimated with unemployment, wages, population density and dummies for suburbs, a ten percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate should give rise to a marginal net outflow between 0.03 and 0.25 percentage point of a district's population annually. Similarly, an increase of average wages by 10 percentage points relative to the national average is associated with an increase in the annual net migrant inflow between 0.03 and 0.08 percentage point (recall that wages are expressed in ratios to national average rather than in levels or logs). Table 8 reports a simple index measuring the responsiveness of migration to regional unemployment rates and average wages. The calculation is based on the regressions with unemployment rates, average wages, population density and suburban dummy (where applicable). The index adds the coefficient obtained for the unemployment rate (multiplied by -10) and the coefficient obtained for the average wage (divided by 10). Hence, the index quantifies the combined effect of a ten percentage-point difference in unemployment rate and a ten percentage point difference in average wage on net immigration -the higher is the value of the index, the greater is the response of migration to regional economic conditions. As the Table reveals, the resulting population increase ranges between 0.08% in Poland and 0.33% in Hungary. With the pace of adjustment this slow, it is not at all surprising that regional differences in unemployment rates and wages in the transition economies have been highly persistent. In contrast, the index for Portugal is almost five times higher (so that the ten percentage-point differential in unemployment and wages leads to a net inflow of 1.5% of the regions population) than the Hungarian index. The Italian index comes close to the figure for Hungary and the Czech Republic whereas the Spanish index is almost zero (this is because of the wrong sign on the effect of wages obtained for Spain). Hence, there is substantial degree of variability in the efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment within transition economies, as well as when comparing them with Southern European countries. Except for Portugal, the potential impact of migration on adverse effects of asymmetric shocks appears rather small.
Implications for EU and EMU Enlargement
Recently, mobility of Eastern European labor received considerable attention also for a different reason -accession to the European Union will eventually introduce the possibility for East Europeans to seek employment throughout the Union. Some current EU member countries, especially the frontline countries, Austria and Germany, are concerned about the prospects of a large influx of migrants from the East. Thus, it is feared that scores of migrants will be attracted by high Western European wages, increasing unemployment and driving down wages of the incumbent workers (see Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, and Boeri and Bruecker, 2000 , for assessment of potential post-enlargement migration).
While the empirical results presented in this paper do not directly enable a forecast of post-enlargement migration, several lessons can be drawn. First, labor mobility in the accession-candidate countries has been low and falling, despite large and increasing wage and unemployment disparities across regions. Second, migration appears to occur chiefly among relatively prosperous regions rather than from depressed ones to those with better economic low, it does respond to regional economic conditions in the correct manner.
conditions. As discussed above, this may reflect the fact that a large fraction of migrants are relatively high skilled high-wage earners. If this pattern continues after the candidate countries' entry to the EU, free mobility of labor may actually have adverse effects on the new entrants (and positive effects on the current members) in as much as it would involve mainly migration of highly skilled workers. Finally, the response of net migration to regional economic characteristics, while statistically significant, is not significant in the economic sense -sizeable differentials in average wages and unemployment rates give rise only to very modest net migration flows. This is illustrated in Table 8 -for example, Portuguese migrants appear much more responsive to regional economic conditions than their counterparts in transition economies. The Czech Republic and Hungary seem comparable to Italy in terms of migration responsiveness, whereas Slovakia and Poland show much weaker response of migration to economic incentives.
The present paper also yields implications with respect to the eventual participation of the transition economies in the EMU. It is envisaged that the new members will join the EMU in due course after becoming members of the EU. This, however, will be an important policy decision, with potentially far-reaching economic implications for the accession countries as well as the incumbent EMU members (in particular, premature admission of new members may undermine the stability of the union as a whole). In the course of intensifying integration, the accession countries should eventually become exposed to similar shocks as the core EMU countries. However, this process can be lengthy and in the meantime the accession countries are likely to continue experiencing shocks that are different from those affecting the EMU core (for example, the transition economies will be more prone to suffer due to adverse economic or political developments in the former Soviet Union countries). Indeed, Frenkel et al. (1999) and Horvath (2001) find that the shocks affect the transition economies are largely uncorrelated with those prevailing in the major EMU economies.
Joining the EMU implies relinquishing autonomy over monetary policy as well as submitting to important restrictions on fiscal policy (due to the Maastricht criteria imposing ceilings on public deficits and debt). Hence, the set of tools available for dealing with asymmetric shocks will be severely reduced by EMU membership. If the accession countries are exposed to asymmetric shocks and their labor markets cannot adjust easily enough to such shocks, then early participation in the EMU may not be the optimal exchange-rate regime for these countries. By retaining their separate currencies, the accession countries will be better able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, given the low responsiveness of labor mobility to regional unemployment and wages, it appears that the candidate countries may not be well equipped to deal with adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Transitional barriers to labor mobility in the wake of the enlargement would in fact only aggravate this problem. Hence, an early entry to the EMU could make the monetary union more fragile and be potentially costly both in economic and political terms.
Conclusions
Labor mobility has the potential to serve as an important channel of regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks, as emigration from depressed regions to the more prosperous ones helps reduce inter-regional differentials in unemployment rates and earnings. This paper assesses the efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment in several postcommunist countries in transition. Economic reforms have had largely asymmetric repercussions in these countries, resulting in large and persistent unemployment and wage differentials, thus making the need for effective regional adjustment particularly acute.
However, the results of the present paper indicate that the role played by labor mobility has been rather limited. While migration indeed responds to inter-regional wage differentials, its responsiveness to unemployment is weaker (and less robust to changes in regression specification). Moreover, the effect of wage differentials on migration is only partially consistent with regional adjustment occurring via migration. Although wages have a positive effect on net migration, they are positively correlated with overall mobility -both gross immigration and emigration. Hence, depressed regions experience low overall migration (inbound and outbound) rather than a net outflow of migrants. The effect of unemployment is, to some extent, similar (although as emphasized above it is less robust to changes in regression specifications) -unemployment tends to discourage not only immigration but also emigration. When comparing post-communist transition economies with Southern European countries, migration patterns in Italy and especially Portugal appear much more effective in facilitating regional adjustment than those in transition economies.
Yet, gross migration flows in transition countries are not negligible -in 1996, gross migration (as a percentage of population) ranged between 0.6% in Slovakia and 1.1% in Poland. However, gross immigration and emigration are strongly correlated and hence the resulting net migration is tiny. This pattern can also be traced in the regression results presented above -while several socio-economic and demographic factors significantly affect gross migration, they often have a similar effect on the inflow and the outflow of migrants.
Even though net migration is found to respond to regional economic characteristics, the effects are economically small and large inter-regional differentials in unemployment and average wages only give rise to modest net migration flows.
The pattern of labor mobility prevailing in transition economies has several important implications. First, regional differentials in unemployment and wages will not get smoothed away by migration. Indeed, as Table 8 demonstrates, it would take decades rather than years for moderately large unemployment and wage differentials to be smoothed away solely by means of migration. An appropriate policy response aimed at increasing labor mobility may be needed in order to avert the creation of new Mezziogiorni. Second, given the low labor mobility -and its low responsiveness to economic incentives -in the accession countries, it seems unlikely that there will be a massive East-West migration in the wake of the next EU enlargement. East Europeans do not move readily even within their own countries, despite sizeable wage and unemployment differentials. Although wage differentials with respect to the current EU members are larger, so are migration costs and informal (e.g. linguistic and cultural) barriers to migration. Third, because of the low efficacy of migration in smoothing away inter-regional differentials in unemployment and wages, an early membership in the EMU is not necessarily the optimal policy choice for the accession countries. EMU membership stipulates loss of autonomous monetary policy and imposes important limitations on counter-cyclical fiscal policy. As the transition countries continue to face different shocks than the EMU core, at least in medium term, they may indeed benefit from retaining the option to adjust their exchange rates. Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared.
2
Level of the wage ratio at which it exerts maximum effect on migration. 
(8) Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared. 
(8) Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared.
Level of the wage ratio at which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration. 
Notes:
1 Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared.
2 Level of the wage ratio at which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration.
Number of observations: 100 (20 districts, average population 512,300 in 1995). T-statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the net inflow rate as a percentage of the region's end-year population. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are lagged by one year. The entrepreneurs, retirees, industrial employment and agricultural employment refer to 1995, while the population density is as of 1994. Entrepreneurs, retirees and university educated are expressed as the percentage of district population. Employment in the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total employment. Notes: The index is based on the regressions with unemployment rates, average wages, population density and suburban dummy (where applicable) as reported above. The index adds up the coefficient obtained for the unemployment rate (multiplied by -10) and the coefficient obtained for the average wage (divided by 10) estimated in regressions that also included population density and dummies for suburban districts (where applicable) as reported above. 
